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I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout the nation, America's private property and business owners
are losing many of the property rights the founders of this great country felt
were of utmost importance.' Consider the plight of the Mach family of Hol-
lywood, Florida.2 After chasing the American dream, the Machs had finally
* The author is a J.D. candidate, December 2007, Nova Southeastern University,
Shepard Broad Law Center. Bradley C. Davis has a B.A. in Organizational Communications
from Purdue University with a minor in Organizational Leadership. The author wishes to
thank his mother Anna and grandfather Don, along with Garry Barker, Kristen, Eric, and Josh
for their support throughout the years.
1. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. See Shannon O'Boye, Widow Promises to Fight Developer Seeking Her Property, S.
FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, June 21, 2005, at BI.
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obtained it in the form of a four-unit retail building in downtown Holly-
wood. 3 For thirty-four years, the Mach family has owned and operated this
building.4 Throughout this period, the property has provided the Machs with
a substantial income and allowed them to work in the city for twenty-five of
those years.5 Katalin Mach, the widowed immigrant who now owns the
property, does not want to sell.6 David Mach, Katalin's son, said that his
father "always wanted to buy because he figured in America, they couldn't
take it."7 Nonetheless, after all of these years of work, during which the
Machs paid taxes and apparently met all other responsibilities of ownership,
the City of Hollywood is threatening to take the property through eminent
domain.8
Eminent domain refers to "[t]he inherent power of a governmental en-
tity to take privately owned property, [especially] land, and convert it to pub-
lic use, subject to reasonable compensation for the taking." 9 This threat is
being made in order to make way for yet another South Florida condomin-
ium development.'0 In July 2004, the city commission approved a develop-
ment plan with the builder, Charles "Chip" Abele, in which they agreed to
use their eminent domain powers if necessary to take the Mach's property."
The City turned down a plan from Mr. Abele which would have left the
Mach's property intact due to concerns about parking. 2
One must consider whether the city has its values right when it shows
greater concern for individuals who may have to walk a block, than to a fam-
ily who has been a part of the city for over three decades. Further, Mr. Abele
claimed that the Machs were "very emotional" and demanded exorbitant
prices for their property. 3 Will he face the same criticism when his 750-
square-foot, one bedroom condos are being sold for $400,000? Just as the
Mach family saw their relatives lose property and businesses in Nazi Ger-
many, the family is now destined to lose their business in the United States
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Michael Mayo, Commentary, A Fight for a Father's Spirit and the American Dream,
S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, July 3, 2005, at B 1 (internal quotations omitted).
8. O'Boye, supra note 2.
.9. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 562 (8th ed. 2004).
10. O'Boye, supra note 2.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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of America.14 The Mach's tragic story is just one example of how the United
States Constitution is being manipulated to crush the American dream.
The problem with a taking claim is that challenging a regulatory taking,
or determining if one has occurred, has been, and continues to be, confusing
for both practitioners and courts alike. Private property and business owners
are at the mercy of the courts and attorneys. While the City of Hollywood
has the power to physically occupy and take the property, the Machs also
face the possibility that their property will be taken through regulation.
Land-use regulations come in many forms including building codes, zoning
ordinances, and growth control statutes. 5 Additionally, such regulations
impose restrictions on landowners regardless of their wishes. 6 Such regula-
tions may, by going "too far,"' 17 effect a taking for which just compensation
is due. 8 This article focuses on the aforementioned regulations, which often
significantly diminish property values and rights, but rarely result in just
compensation.
While the recent United States Supreme Court decision of Lingle v.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. 9 helped define certain narrow categories of regulatory
takings,2° the Court has left open the interpretation of the test set forth in
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,21 which considers certain
facts and circumstances that are used to adjudicate a case without considera-
tion of wider application.22 Among the facts and circumstances set forth in
Penn Central are "[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant
and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with dis-
tinct investment-backed expectations. 23 Therefore, the courts have indicated
that they are "unable to develop any 'set formula' for determining" whether a
regulatory taking has occurred.24 Instead, the Penn Central test focuses on
the magnitude "of the burden that [the] government imposes upon private
14. Mayo, supra note 7.
15. WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 518 (3d ed.
2000).
16. See id.
17. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
18. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 301 (8th ed. 2004). Just compensation is defined as,
a payment by the government for property it has taken under eminent domain-f[usually] the
property's fair market value, so that the owner is theoretically no worse off after the taking."
Id.
19. 125 S. Ct. 2074 (2005).
20. Id. at 2081-82.
21. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
22. See id. at 124.
23. Id.
24. Id.
20061
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property rights., 25  The problem is determining when the government has
exceeded its power by taking private property through regulation.26
In light of last year's three takings decisions,2 which have come down
from the United States Supreme Court, American property owners now face
a greater risk of losing their homes and businesses to government regulation
than ever before.28 These decisions may be read to indicate that the Court
feels property rights have gone as far as they should. The destruction of cer-
tain regulatory takings tests which favored property owners, coupled with the
decision in Kelo v. City of New London, in which the United States Supreme
Court held that private property may be taken for private development,29 has
resulted in a severe blow to property rights. Finally, with the massive real
estate development occurring in Florida and throughout major urban centers,
the rights of property owners need to be clearly established. It is for these
reasons that the Penn Central test needs to be reexamined in order to provide
property owners the protections to which they are constitutionally entitled.3"
This article will provide an analysis of regulatory takings jurisprudence and
recommendations to fix the broken balancing test in Penn Central.
There are few, if any, subjects that conjure a more heated debate than
that of regulatory takings. 3 ' This debate is due in part to the numerous, and
often conflicting, holdings of the United States Supreme Court32 which have
led to "ad hoc, factual inquiries, 33 balancing tests,' nuisance exceptions,35
25. Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2082.
26. Id. at 2081; Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922).
27. Lingle, 125 S. Ct. 2074; San Remo Hotel v. City of San Francisco, 125 S. Ct. 2491
(2005); Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
28. See generally Kelo, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (upholding decision allowing private property to
be taken for private development).
29. Id. at 2668.
30. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
31. See generally James E. Krier, Book Review, Takings from Freund to Fischel, 84
GEo. L.J. 1895 (1996); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on
the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation'" Law, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1165 (1967); Joseph
L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964); Molly L. Dillon, Comment,
Legislative Expansion of Fifth Amendment "Takings"? A Discussion of the Regulatory Tak-
ings Law and Proposed Compensation Legislation, 15 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 243
(1997).
32. Jerome M. Organ, Understanding State and Federal Property Rights Legislation, 48
OKLA. L. REv. 191 (1995). Organ notes that:
The Supreme Court has been much less clear and consistent, however, in deciding when
the Fifth Amendment requires the state to compensate a property owner whose land the
state has not physically taken, but merely has regulated to such an extent that the property
owner has lost the opportunity to enjoy much of the "economic value" associated with her
property.
Id. at 191.
33. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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and per se rules 36-which all seem to conflict in varying degrees. Such con-
flict has left lawyers and courts with little guidance in deciding takings issues
on a case-by-case basis. As Justice Stevens once stated, "[elven the wisest
lawyers would have to acknowledge great uncertainty about the scope of this
Court's takings jurisprudence."37
In order to work through this great uncertainty and provide a proper
background for a clear understanding of this article, Part II will give an over-
view of American regulatory takings jurisprudence, which will include a
discussion of some of the major cases in the development of regulatory tak-
ings. Part lI will discuss Lingle and what implications it may have for the
future of the Penn Central test. Part IV will analyze Penn Central and rec-
ommend ways to turn the test in favor of private property owners. In Part V,
a conclusion will reinforce the suggestions set forth in Part IV, and encour-
age Americans to defend against the governmental taking of their private
property.
II. AMERICAN REGULATORY TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE
"The threshold issue in any regulatory takings case is whether the
claimant can point to some property interest she held as of the date of the
alleged taking that was affected by the challenged government action.
38
Also, the property interest must be one "that the claimant can claim a pro-
tected right to exploit. '39 A regulatory taking occurs when government regu-
lation or action goes so far as to constitute a taking, even though no property
or title to such property is actually taken.40
The threat that a government may exercise its power to take property or
frustrate the owner's expectations, so long as just compensation is paid, is
undoubtedly a significant invasion of the rights of private property owners.4 '
34. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 (1980); Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438
U.S. at 124.
35. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1022-23 (1992).
36. Id. at 1027 (setting forth the total diminution in value test); Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982) (setting forth the permanent physical inva-
sion test).
37. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 866 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
38. John D. Echeverria, Friedenburg v. DEC: A Troubling Regulatory Takings Ruling,
15 ENVTL. L. IN N.Y., 47,47 (2004), available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi/
papers/friedenburg.pdf.
39. Id. at 48.
40. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922).
41. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089, 1092 n.7, 1092-93 (1972)
(noting the role of property rules in transactions involving real property).
2006]
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While the protections set forth in the Constitution should ensure individuals
who have their property taken will not suffer financially, such an exchange
does not leave everyone feeling satisfied with the transaction.42 The Mach
family example, set forth in the Introduction, is a concrete representation of
such a situation.4 ' For the Mach family, no amount of money can make up
for the sentimental ties which flow from the generational ownership of their
building.44 To suggest that an exchange of money for property is "fair" or
"just" overlooks the fact that property is not fungible, which means, "each
parcel of land is 'unique' and therefore money damages cannot be an accu-
rate substitute."45 Anthony Kronman's article on specific performance ad-
dressed this issue by stating:
In asserting that the subject matter of a particular contract is
unique and has no established market value, a court is really say-
ing that it cannot obtain, at reasonable cost, enough information
about substitutes to permit it to calculate an award of money dam-
ages without imposing an unacceptably high risk of undercompen-
sation on the injured promisee. Conceived in this way, the
uniqueness test seems economically sound. 46
However, government regulation is necessary to a certain degree.47 In
fact, the United States Supreme Court has held that regulation is necessary
for the proper performance of our government.48 Nevertheless, the Takings
Clause must be read literally in order to enforce private property owners'
constitutional rights.49
A. The United States Constitution
The guarantee against taking without just compensation is among the
many fundamental rights set forth in the United States Constitution.50 The
Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause provides that private property shall not
42. See id.
43. See JESSE DUKEMiNIER & JAMEs E. KRiER, PRoPERTY 589 (5th ed. 2002).
44. O'Boye, supra note 2.
45. DuKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 43, at 589.
46. Anthony T. Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. Cn. L. REv. 351, 362 (1978).
47. See Georgia v. City of Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472,480 (1924).
48. See id. (stating that "[t]he taking of private property for public use upon just compen-
sation is so often necessary for the proper performance of governmental functions that the
power is deemed to be essential to the life of the State").
49. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
50. See id.
[Vol. 30:3:445
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"be taken for public use, without just compensation."'" The Takings Clause
is made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment which
states, in pertinent part: "nor shall any [sitate deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law."52 These amendments are
meant to provide a safeguard against governmental abuses of power. 3 While
an initial reading may seem straightforward, these words have caused confu-
sion for well over a century.
5 4
B. The Constitutional Interpretation
1. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon is considered to mark the birth of the
idea that a government action or regulation may result in a taking which re-
quires just compensation.55 In fact, until the Court's decision in Mahon, "it
was generally thought that the Takings Clause reached only a 'direct appro-
priation' of property.., or the functional equivalent of a 'practical ouster of
[the owner's] possession."' 56
In Mahon, the plaintiffs owned the surface of the land, but the deed re-
served the right to remove the coal under the Mahons' land to Pennsylvania
Coal. 7 At issue was the Kohler Act, which prevented the mining of coal in
ways that would cause the disturbance, or sinking, of "any structure used as a
human habitation."" Ultimately, the Court held the statute had resulted in an
unconstitutional taking of Pennsylvania Coal's property.59 This was in part
51. Id.
52. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Chi., Burlington, & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chi-
cago, 166 U.S. 226, 236 (1897) (stating that although the state "legislature may prescribe a
form of procedure to be observed in the taking of private property for public use, but it is not
due process of law if provision be not made for compensation").
53. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
54. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 866 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing).
55. See Janet McClafferty Dunlap, This Land Is My Land: The Clash Between Private
Property and the Public Interest in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 33 B.C. L. REV.
797, 808 (1992) (indicating that prior to the year in which Mahon was decided, the United
States Supreme Court found no taking if the government had a legitimate public purpose for
the challenged regulation and no trespass had occurred on the land).
56. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992) (alteration in original)
(citations omitted).
57. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,412 (1922).
58. Id. at 412-13.
59. Id. at 414.
2006]
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due to the fact that "[w]hat makes the right to mine coal valuable is that it
can be exercised with profit. To make it commercially impracticable to mine
certain coal has very nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes as
appropriating or destroying it."6
Justice Holmes highlighted the eternal struggle between individual
property rights and governmental power in the following quote:
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to
property could not be diminished without paying for every such change
in the general law. As long recognized, some values are enjoyed under
an implied limitation and must yield to the police power. But obviously
the implied limitation must have its limits, or the contract and due proc-
ess clauses are gone. One fact for consideration in determining such
limits is the extent of the diminution. When it reaches a certain magni-
tude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent
domain and compensation to sustain the act. So the question depends
upon the particular facts.6'
The preceding language clearly indicates the power that the Constitu-
tion provides to both private property owners and governments. 62 This lan-
guage also marks the birth of the "diminution in value" test" and the consid-
eration of the economic impact of regulations on property owners. 64 While
disagreement abounds as to the proper interpretation of Mahon, it "is uni-
formly held to stand for the proposition that the judiciary should closely scru-
tinize economic legislation for potential unconstitutionality '65 in order to
ensure that the government is not abusing its power.66
In one of the most famous lines in regulatory takings jurisprudence, Jus-
tice Holmes stated, "[tihe general rule at least is, that while property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as
a taking. 67 The problem with this often quoted phrase is that it fails to clar-
ify how to determine what is too far.68 The diminution in value test is one
way that Justice Holmes attempted to define how far is too far. 69 A more
60. Id.
61. Id. at 413.
62. See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413.
63. See id. at 413.
64. Id. at 413-14.
65. William Michael Treanor, Jam for Justice Holmes: Reassessing the Significance of
Mahon, 86 GEO. L.J. 813, 816 (1998).
66. Id.
67. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.
68. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2081 (2005).
69. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.
[Vol. 30:3:445
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recent example of the consideration of economic factors, or diminution in
value test, is set forth in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission
v. Hamilton Bank.70 In Williamson, the Court held that its task was "to dis-
tinguish the point at which regulation becomes so onerous that it has the
same effect as an appropriation of the property through eminent domain or
physical possession."'" While many questions were left unanswered in
Mahon, regulatory takings, a balancing test, and economic considerations
complicated the previously straightforward analysis of the Fifth Amend-
ment.72
2. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City
After leaving so many critical questions unanswered in Mahon, many
commentators expected that the floodgates of regulatory takings litigation
would open.73 However, it was not until fifty-five years later, in Penn Cen-
tral that the United States Supreme Court made a significant effort to clarify
these unanswered questions.74
In Penn Central, the Court admitted that it was "unable to develop any
'set formula' for determining when 'justice and fairness' require that eco-
nomic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government,
rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons. 75 In-
stead, the Court indicated that it will engage in "ad hoc, factual inquiries"
which balance the important factors of each particular case.76 These factors
will be highlighted and discussed in Part IV of this article.
3. Agins v. City of Tiburon
One of the reasons that this article is placing a new emphasis on the
Penn Central test is due to the recent destruction of the regulatory takings
test set forth in Agins v. City of Tiburon.77 In Agins, the landowners filed suit
claiming that the city had unconstitutionally taken their property in violation
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 78 The landowners' claim arose out
of zoning ordinances which were enacted after the purchase of the land and
70. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
71. Id. at 199.
72. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992).
73. STOEBUCK & WHrrMAN, supra note 15, at 530.
74. Id.
75. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
76. Id.
77. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
78. Id. at 258.
2006]
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prevented the claimants from building on their property as originally ex-
pected.79
The United States Supreme Court held that the regulation of a "particu-
lar property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance
legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically viable use of his
land."80 The State of California felt that the maintenance of open spaces was
an important state interest and that the zoning ordinance substantially ad-
vanced that interest." Therefore, the Court held that the ordinance passed
constitutional muster.
82
Since Agins was decided, the "substantial advancement test" has been
favored by property rights advocates.83 This favoritism was shown because
the Agins test allowed claimants to challenge the effectiveness of a govern-
ment regulation.84 If the claimant can show that the governmental action or
regulation does not substantially advance a legitimate state interest, the
claimant will prevail regardless of economic impact, or other considera-
tions.
4. Those Other Takings Tests
In the interest of clarity, this section will briefly look at some other tests
the Lingle decision helped set forth. While these tests are not the focus of
this paper, they should be analyzed and distinguished.
First, there are instances when the government has interfered in such a
way that the owner has suffered "a permanent physical occupation" of their
property.86 In these situations, the permanent invasion, no matter how minor,
demands that just compensation be made.87 This type of takings test was
first set forth in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.88
79. Id. at 257.
80. Id. at 260 (citations omitted).
81. Id. at 261.
82. Agins, 447 U.S. at 261.
83. Marcia Coyle, Takings Tussle, DAILY Bus. REv., June 3, 2005, at A10; see also
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2077-79 (2005) (indicating that Chevron
used the Agins test to move forward with its claim).
84. See Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2079.
85. See id.
86. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982) (finding
a taking where a state law requires landlord to allow cable companies to install their facilities
on or in the buildings).
87. Id. at 425; Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2081.
88. 458 U.S. at 426.
[Vol. 30:3:445
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Next, there may be a total regulatory taking as defined in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council.89 In Lucas, the Court held that if the government,
through a regulation, denied a property owner all economically viable use of
his or her property, then a taking must be found and just compensation must
be paid.90 However, the Court noted that when such a regulation is designed
to prohibit a use that is or could be a nuisance, an exception to the Lucas test
will be found.9'
Finally, the Court held that takings claims which flow from land-use
exactions must be examined through the tests set fort in Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission92 and Dolan v. City of Tigard.93 Land use exactions
"include dedications of land to the public, installation of public improve-
ments, and exactions of money for public purposes that are imposed by gov-
ernmental entities upon developers of land as conditions of development
permission."'  This duo of cases sets forth two important points. In Nollan,
the Court stated that there must be a nexus between the condition sought and
the problem to be alleviated.' In other words, the exaction must be calcu-
lated to advance the interest that is used to justify the exaction.96 Dolan went
a step further by indicating that when a nexus exists, there must be some
"rough proportionality" between the thing exacted and the development per-
mitted in exchange. 97 Here again, courts and practitioners are left with a test
that does not clarify the meaning of its terms.9
Outside of these narrow categories, regulatory takings. cases fall under
the Penn Central test. 99 The preceding tests are relatively easy to work with
in comparison to Penn Central.'° For example, when a property owner has
suffered a "permanent physical invasion," or has lost all value associated
with his or her property, it is nearly impossible to argue that just compensa-
tion should not be paid.' 0 ' However, as this article will show, not all of these
tests have survived subsequent interpretations of the United States Supreme
Court.
89. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
90. Id. at 1027.
91. Id. at 1022-23.
92. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
93. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
94. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 15, at 675.
95. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
96. Id.
97. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
98. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 15, at 684.
99. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2081 (2005).
100. See id. (stating that Loretto and Lucas are "per se" or "categorical" takings).
101. Id.
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I. DISCUSSION OF LINGLE V. CHEVRON U.S.A., INc.
While property rights advocates have favored the Agins "substantial ad-
vancement test" for twenty-five years, the recent United States Supreme
Court decision of Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A, Inc. effectively destroyed the
Agins test.'1 2 Due to this rare, unanimous decision from the Court, scholars
have indicated that the next "turn of the wheel" will be a case which helps
define the meaning of the Penn Central test." 3
A. A Statement of the Case
Showing apparent concern for the public welfare in relation to the ar-
guably oligopolistic concentration in the gasoline market, the Hawaii Legis-
lature passed Act 257 in 19 97."°  The key effect of Act 257 involved a rent
ceiling that oil companies could charge dealers who lease their service sta-
tions from the company. 5 This ceiling limited rent to fifteen percent of the
102. Id. at 2087.
103. Coyle, supra note 83.
104. HAW. REv. STAT. § 486H-10.4 (Supp. 2004); Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2078.
105. § 486H-10.4. Section 486H-10.4 states:
(a) Beginning August 1, 1997, no manufacturer or jobber shall convert an existing dealer
retail station to a company retail station; provided that nothing in this section shall limit a
manufacturer or jobber from:
(1) Continuing to operate any company operated retail service stations legally in exis-
tence on July 31, 1997;
(2) Constructing and operating any new retail service stations as company retail sta-
tions constructed after August 1, 1997, subject to subsection (b); or
(3) Operating a former dealer retail station for up to twenty-four months until a re-
placement dealer can be found if the former dealer vacates the service station, cancels
the franchise, or is properly terminated or not renewed.
(b) No new company retail station shall be located within one-eighth mile of a dealer re-
tail station in an urban area, and within one-quarter mile in other areas.
(c) All leases as part of a franchise as defined in section 486H-1, existing on August 1,
1997, or entered into thereafter, shall be construed in conformity with the following:
(1) Such renewal shall not be scheduled more frequently than once every three years;
and
(2) Upon renewal, the lease rent payable shall not exceed fifteen per cent of the gross
sales, except for gasoline, which shall not exceed fifteen per cent of the gross profit of
product, excluding all related taxes by the dealer operated retail service station as de-
fined in section 486H-1 and 486H-10.4 plus, in the case of a retail service station at a lo-
cation where the manufacturer or jobber is the lessee and not the owner of the ground
lease, a percentage increase equal to any increase which the manufacturer or jobber is
required to pay the lessor under the ground lease for the service station. For the purposes
of this subsection, "gross amount" means all monetary earnings of the dealer from a
dealer operated retail service station after all applicable taxes, excluding income taxes,
are paid.
The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to any existing contracts that may be in
conflict with its provisions.
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dealer's gross profits from gasoline sales plus fifteen percent of gross sales
of products other than gasoline.' °6
At the time of the case, Chevron dominated the Hawaii market by con-
trolling roughly "60 percent of the market for gasoline produced or refined
in-state and 30 percent of the wholesale market on the State's most populous
island, Oahu.' ' 10 7 This market share was accomplished through "64 inde-
pendent lessee-dealer stations.' ' Through this relationship, Chevron pur-
chases the land, erects the station, and then leases the station to independent
dealers at a rent determined by a percentage of the dealer's sales, which al-
lows Chevron to unilaterally set the price for gasoline."°
Within a month of Act 257 being enacted, Chevron filed suit in the
United States District Court for the District of Hawaii." ° Chevron's main
claim was that the rent cap constituted an unconstitutional regulatory taking,
thereby violating the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments."' Shortly thereaf-
ter, Chevron moved for summary judgment claiming "that the rent cap [did]
not substantially advance any legitimate government interest.",' 2 The Dis-
trict Court agreed with Chevron's analysis and granted the summary judg-
ment. "'13 The District Court made the following findings: 1) the statute
would not reduce the lessee-dealers' rents or retail prices; 2) dealers who
were selling their stations could "charge the incoming lessee a premium" so
the new lessee's would not obtain the benefits from the rent cap; 3) oil com-
panies would gain back their lost rents by unilaterally increasing fuel price;
and 4) the Act would decrease the number of lessee-dealer stations because
the rent cap would discourage companies, such as Chevron, from investing in
such stations." 4 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
District Court had applied the correct legal standard but vacated the summary
judgment stating that there was a "genuine issue of material fact ... as to
whether the Act would [actually] benefit consumers."' 5 Finally, on remand,
(d) Nothing in this section shall prohibit a dealer from selling a retail service station in
any manner.
Id.
106. Id.
107. Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2078.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 2078-79.
111. Id. at 2079.
112. Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2079.
113. Id. (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Cayetano (Chevron 1), 57 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1014
(D. Haw. 1998)).
114. Id.; Chevron 1,57 F. Supp. 2d at 1010-14.
115. Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2079 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Cayetano (Chevron I1), 224
F.3d 1030, 1037-42 (9th Cir. 2000)).
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the District Court upheld the previous findings that the statute would not
substantially advance a legitimate state interest. 16 This holding was reached
after hearing competing expert economists' opinions of the effects of the
statute.' 17 The State of Hawaii's further attempts to challenge the ruling were
rejected, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari." 8  The
aforementioned procedural history shows the confusion this subject has
caused the courts.
B. Why the Divergence? The United States Supreme Court's Reasoning
Faced with numerous splits among the courts and confusion throughout
the field, the United States Supreme Court hoped to bring some clarity to
regulatory takings tests." 9 The Ninth Circuit, where Lingle took place, and
the First Circuit, consistently applied the "substantially advance test."'120
"Other federal courts hadn't rejected it, but didn't know what to do with it.
A number of state courts had applied it as well.'' In other words, the con-
fusion was apparent and pervasive. 22
Clarifying the confusion, Justice O'Connor, in the telling opening state-
ment of Lingle wrote:
On occasion, a would-be doctrinal rule or test finds its way into
our case law through simple repetition of a phrase-however fortui-
tously coined. A quarter century ago, in Agins v. City of Tiburon, the
Court declared that government regulation of private property "effects a
taking if [such regulation] does not substantially advance legitimate
state interests .... " Through reiteration in a half dozen or so decisions
since Agins, this language has been ensconced in our Fifth Amendment
takings jurisprudence. 123
Next, Justice O'Connor gave a brief overview of takings jurisprudence
before getting into the heart of the majority's analysis.'24 The majority was
exceptionally clear in laying out the distinct categories of takings claims.'25
116. Id. at 2080 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Cayetano (Chevron 111), 198 F. Supp. 2d
1182, 1193 (D. Haw. 2002)).
117. Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2080 (citing Chevron II1, 198 F. Supp. 2d at 1188).
118. Id.
119. See id. at 2081 (highlighting the categories of regulatory takings tests).
120. Coyle, supra note 83.
121. Id. (quoting Georgetown's John D. Echeverria).
122. See id.
123. Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2077-78 (citations omitted) (alterations in original).
124. See id. at 2080-81.
125. Id. at 2081.
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These claims, which were discussed earlier, include: 1) permanent physical
invasions of property; 2) deprivation of all economically beneficial use of his
or her property; 3) exactions; and 4) claims falling under the Penn Central
test. 26 The Court acknowledged that the categories falling outside the Penn
Central test are "relatively narrow."' 27 Emphasis was placed on the fact that
regulatory takings tests aim to determine the severity of the burden that such
regulations impose upon private property owners,128 which was an indication
of where the opinion was headed.
The Court dealt the final blow to the Agins "substantially advance test"
when it disapproved of the fact that the test has been read to be a stand alone
test, "wholly independent of Penn Central or any other test."' 29 The Court
determined that the Agins test focused on due process and not takings juris-
prudence. 3 ' Showing further approval for the focus of the more deferential
Penn Central test, the Court stated:
In stark contrast to the three regulatory takings tests discussed above, the
"substantially advances" inquiry reveals nothing about the magnitude or
character of the burden a particular regulation imposes upon private prop-
erty rights. Nor does it provide any information about how any regulatory
burden is distributed among property owners. In consequence, this test
does not help to identify those regulations whose effects are functionally
comparable to government appropriation or invasion of private property; it
is tethered neither to the text of the Takings Clause nor to the basic justifi-
cation for allowing regulatory actions to be challenged under the
Clause. 131
As the preceding quote indicates, the Court highlighted the fact that the
Agins "substantially advances" test was a "means-ends test."'32 The Agins
test asks "whether a regulation of private property is effective in achieving
some legitimate public purpose" instead of determining the magnitude or
character of the regulation. 33 Following this determination, the Court held
126. Id.; see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426
(1982) (state law requiring landlords to permit cable companies to install cable facilities in
apartment buildings effected a taking); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)
(economically beneficial use test); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104
(1978).
127. Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2081.
128. Id. at 2082.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2083.
131. Id. at 2084.
132. Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2083.
133. Id.
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that the Agins test is flawed as a takings test because the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment presupposes that the regulation serves a legitimate,
beneficial effect to the public. 34 Therefore, the Takings Clause is not con-
cerned with whether a regulation is valid on its face, but whether the regula-
tion has such a severe impact on the property owner that just compensation is
required.'35 Consequently, the Agins test is "logically prior to and distinct
from the question [of] whether a regulation effects a taking."'36
In simplistic form, the Court established how a proper takings test
would analyze Chevron's claims by looking at the burden and value loss
associated with Act 257.137 The Court highlighted that there is no clear indi-
cation that Chevron suffered any severe burden or lost revenue which re-
quires just compensation. 138 Chevron expected to regain its losses by raising
the price of the gasoline it sells to the independent lessee-dealer's. 39 How-
ever, the Court does note that Chevron could have brought its claim under
the Penn Central test.' 4 The foregoing analysis suggests that if Chevron
would have brought suit under Penn Central, its claim would have failed.14'
C. A Look to the Future
While the Lingle decision clarified the question of whether the Agins
substantially advances test is proper for regulatory takings, the opinion did
not indicate a proper interpretation of the Penn Central test or attempt to
define its terms. 42 The Penn Central test is vitally important to takings ju-
risprudence because nearly all regulatory takings actions fall under it.'4 3 The
destruction of the Agins test,'" coupled with the recent decisions of Kelo and
San Remo Hotel, demands the test be reexamined in order to provide what
little protection is left to property owners. "45 As John Adams once stated,
"[t]he moment ... the idea is admitted into society that property is not as
sacred as the laws of God, and that there is not a force of law and public jus-
134. See id. at 2084-85.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 2084.
137. Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2084-86.
138. Id. at 2084-85.
139. Id. at 2085.
140. See id. at 2087.
141. See id. at 2084-86.
142. Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2081-82.
143. Coyle, supra note 83.
144. Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2078.
145. See generally id.; Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2668 (2005) (both
cases upheld the government's regulatory takings).
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tice to protect it, anarchy and tyranny commence."'" The force of law and
public justice Adams spoke of is fading with each subsequent interpretation
by the United States Supreme Court)47
IV. SUBSTANTIALLY ADVANCING PENN CENTRAL?
Penn Central has been defined as the "polestar" of American regulatory
takings jurisprudence.' Being classified as the polestar indicates that the
Penn Central test has always been the most widely used takings test.'49 In
fact, "98 percent of regulatory takings cases fall under the Penn Central
wing." 50 However, following the decision in Lingle, the Penn Central test
has been substantially advanced and is now the most important takings case
which the United States Supreme Court needs to interpret.' 5'
Interpreting Penn Central has proven to be extremely difficult and con-
fusing, and has even been described as "inscrutable. 1 52 This difficulty is due
to Justice Brennan's introduction of a new balancing test which considers
multiple factors. 3 As mentioned earlier, Justice Brennan indicated that the
Court was unable to develop a "set formula" for regulatory takings cases, but
instead held that the Court would engage in "essentially ad hoc, factual in-
quiries."'"M Justice Brennan identified the important factors in these inquiries
when he stated:
In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, the
Court's decisions have identified several factors that have particu-
lar significance. The economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of
course, relevant considerations. So, too, is the character of the
governmental action. A "taking" may more readily be found when
the interference with property can be characterized as a physical
invasion by government, than when interference arises from some
146. Union Pac. R.R. v. United States, 99 U.S. 700, 767 (1878) (quoting John Adams)
(internal quotations omitted).
147. See Lingle, 125 S. Ct. 2074; Kelo, 125 S. Ct. 2655.
148. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
149. See Coyle, supra note 83.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See id.
153. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
154. Id.
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public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life
to promote the common good.' 55
In Penn Central, these factors were applied in order to determine
whether a historic landmark law, which prevented the owners of Grand Cen-
tral Station from building an office high-rise, resulted in a taking for which
just compensation was due.'56 The proposal set forth for the high-rise com-
plied with all zoning and development regulations that were in place at the
time. 57 However, because the City of New York felt that the "special his-
toric, cultural, or architectural significance [would] enhance the quality of
life for all, 1 58 the owner of a designated landmark was required to maintain,
at their own expense, the exterior of the building.' 59 Further, before the
owner of a landmark could alter the exterior or construct any improvements
to the landmark, they were required to seek approval from a regulatory body
known as the Landmark Preservation Commission."'s Penn Central sought
the necessary approval from the Landmark Preservation Commission by
submitting two separate plans.' 6' Both plans submitted to the Commission
were denied.162 Penn Central then sought declaratory judgment and injunc-
tive relief to prevent the City of New York from applying the Landmarks
Preservation Law to prevent the construction of the office building.63 After
making its way through the courts, the case wound up in the United States
Supreme Court."6 The Court held, over strong dissent, that a taking had not
occurred. 65 The Court noted that the regulation had a significant impact on
the use of the property, but did not go too far.' 66 The scales of justice tipped
in favor of the government, and the notion that property provides security,
155. Id. (citations omitted).
156. Id. at 107.
157. Id. at 116.
158. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 108.
159. Id. at 111-12.
160. Id. at 110, 112.
161. ld. at 116.
162. Id. at 117.
163. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 119. Penn Central also sought damages for a
"temporary taking," and a determination as to whether "transferable development rights"
would equate "just compensation" if a taking was found. Id. at 119, 122.
164. Id. at 119-22.
165. Id. at 138.
166. Id. at 137.
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which was set forth in Mahon, was replaced with the notion that property
should provide efficiency for society at large.
167
However, Justice Rehnquist fired back with a powerful dissent.168 He
first attacked the decision because the landmark designation singled out Penn
Central. 169 Penn Central suffered a significant financial burden and received
no meaningful benefit in return. 17 Singling out individual property owners
violates the fundamental notion that a government should not impose bur-
dens upon individuals which should be carried by society at large. 7' Further,
there was no "reciprocity of advantage"172 present to Penn Central because
they received no benefit from the landmark designation.'73 While zoning
ordinances may at times reduce property values, such a burden is shared be-
tween many individuals, thereby leaving some benefit to those affected by
the zoning ordinance.'74 In contrast, Penn Central received no such benefit,
but instead faced a multi-million dollar burden. 175  Had this burden been
placed upon the population of the City of New York, the cost "per person
would be in cents per year."'
176
Therefore, Justice Rehnquist's dissent shows that the case should have
been decided in favor of Penn Central. 17  Penn Central suffered a significant
economic impact, which exceeded several million dollars a year. 178 A rea-
sonable investment-backed expectation was lost due to the preclusion of an
office high-rise. 179  Prior to the landmark designation, Penn Central obvi-
167. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922); Basil H. Mattingly, Forum
Over Substance: The Empty Ritual of Balancing in Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 36
WILLAMEIrE L. REV. 695, 701 (2000). Mattingly defined these terms by stating:
This article use the phrase "property as security" to describe a regulatory regime
that maximizes the landowner's rights in property and protects the property owner
against governmental interference, allowing, to the greatest extent feasible, the
rights of the landowner to utilize her property as she chooses. By. contrast, the
phrase "efficiency of property" refers to an environment in which much greater def-
erence is given to the government's ability to regulate and restrict private property
without compensation.
Id. at 700 n.33.
168. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 138 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
169. See id. at 139.
170. Id.
171. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
172. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.
173. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 139.
174. Id. at 147 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 149.
176. Id. at 148.
177. See id. at 138-53.
178. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 149 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 142.
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ously had an expectation to build an office in their air space. 8 ' Finally, be-
cause there was no "reciprocity of advantage"''8' and the regulation imposed
a burden upon an individual, "which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole,"' 82 the character of the regulation does not
pass the third prong of the Penn Central test. 183
A. The Destructible Landmarks of Penn Central
Justice Rehnquist's dissent shows that the Penn Central test can be in-
terpreted in a way that favors property rights." However, a number of
landmark factors coming out of Penn Central stand in the way of reaching
the "justice and fairness" for which this test strives. 185
The first element which stands in the way of justice and fairness is
known as the "whole property" rule. 86 The whole property rule commands
that a court may only consider the effects of a government action or regula-
tion on the whole parcel, as opposed to a specific portion of that parcel. 187
This rule was set forth in Penn Central when Justice Brennan wrote that tak-
ings "jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and
attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been en-
tirely abrogated.' 88
Since the decision in Mahon, courts recognize that a regulation may re-
sult in a taking if it "goes too far."189 However, since Penn Central, deter-
mining if a regulation has gone "too far" depends upon "ad hoc, factual in-
quiries," or the facts of the case at hand."9° The problem is that the courts
must determine what property, or part of the property, is being affected to
determine whether the regulation goes "too far." 9' If only the whole parcel
180. Id.; see also United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (holding that air rights
may be taken).
181. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
182. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
183. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
184. Id. at 138-53 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 124 (majority opinion).
186. Id. at 130; Daniel R. Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations in Taking Law, 27
URB. LAW. 215, 217 (1995).
187. STOEBUCK & WrTmAN, supra note 15, at 536 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438
U.S. at 104).
188. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 130.
189. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922).
190. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124; Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.
191. John E. Fee, Comment, Unearthing the Denominator in Regulatory Taking Claims,
61 U. Cm. L. RaV. 1535, 1536 (1994); Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.
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can be considered in the analysis, a regulatory taking will rarely be found. 19 2
Consider the following example of the unfairness of the whole parcel rule
among property owners of land of varying size or values.
[I]f we have an owner of 100 acres of land and also an owner of 10
acres of the same quality of land, then, if piecemealing is not al-
lowed, the owner of the 100 acres would receive no compensation
if 10 (or probably even more) acres were put into an unusable land
reserve, but the owner of the 10 acres would be compensated if his
10 acres were similarly restricted.'93
The preceding example represents an unfair use of the "deep pocket"
doctrine.' 94 Further, the decision in Mahon may be read to indicate that
courts should focus on the loss in value to the affected parcel of property.1
95
In Mahon, Justice Holmes focused on how the Kohler Act diminished the
value of the part of the coal company's rights that were affected, not the en-
tire parcel. 196 While this issue remains to be resolved, this article suggests
abolishing the whole parcel rule in order to get closer to the fairness for
which the Penn Central test currently strives.' 97 In fact, the Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals have already em-
braced this interpretation.'98
Next, the Court in Penn Central rejected "the proposition that diminu-
tion in property value, standing alone, can establish a 'taking."' 99 Holding
that diminution in value is not enough to establish a taking contradicts what
the Court previously held in its opinion by stating that one important factor
in the Penn Central test is the "economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant. ' 200 While the Court did not clarify how much of an economic im-
pact would result in a taking,2"' one may deduce that the greater the adverse
192. Id.
193. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 15, at 537.
194. See Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle,
57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561,566-69 (1984).
195. Treanor, supra note 65, at 824.
196. Id.
197. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
198. See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1181 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(finding a taking by considering only twelve and a half out of fifty acres for the purposes of a
regulatory taking); Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey, 95 F.3d 1422,
1433-34 (9th Cir. 1996).
199. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 131.
200. Id. at 124.
201. Id.
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effects on the claimant, the greater the likelihood of a taking.2 °2 However,
this interpretation cannot be squared with subsequent decisions by the United
States Supreme Court.20 3 For example, in Lucas, the Court held that a taking
will often occur "[w]here the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives
land of all economically beneficial use."2" Consideration of the statement in
Lucas indicates that the Court feels that a negative economic impact can lead
to a taking, so long as there is a total loss of value.205
While the Court in Penn Central never expressly held that the three
prongs of the test should be considered together or alone, analysis of the
"economic impact of the regulation" on the claimant prong of the Penn Cen-
tral test shows that the three prongs of the test are to be considered to-
gether.206 Such an analysis means property owners who have suffered a
ninety-five percent loss of their property value will not be compensated,
while an owner suffering a 100 percent diminution of value will recover the
full value of the land.2" As Judge Smith said in Florida Rock Industries, Inc.
v. United States (Florida Rock V),208 "[t]he notion that the government can
take two thirds of your property and not compensate you but must compen-
sate you if it takes 100% has a ring of irrationality, if not unfairness, about
it.
,,209
A better approach is set forth in Florida Rock V, where the Federal
Claims Court found that a ninety-five percent diminution in value was sub-
stantial enough to constitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment. 210 In Flor-
ida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States (Florida Rock IV), the Federal Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals held that the Fifth Amendment does not limit guaran-
tees against uncompensable takings to only categorical or complete regula-
tory takings.211 Therefore, in cases falling under the Penn Central test which
deal with less than total takings, the question remains as to "when a partial
loss of economic use of the property has crossed the line from a noncom-
202. John D. Echeverria, Is the Penn Central Three-Factor Test Ready for History's Dust-
bin?, 52 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. 3, 3 (2000) [hereinafter Echeverria II].
203. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
204. Id. at 1027.
205. See id.
206. See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 714 (1987); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444
U.S. 164, 175 (1979).
207. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1064 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
208. 45 Fed. Cl. 21 (1999).
209. Id. at 23.
210. Id.
211. Fla. Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States (Fla. Rock IV), 18 F.3d 1560, 1570 (Fed. Cir.
1994).
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pensable 'mere diminution' to a compensable 'partial taking. ' '21 2 In Florida
Rock V, Judge Loren Smith set forth the conditions under which a substan-
tial, but not complete loss of economically viable use becomes a com-
pensable taking under the Penn Central test.213 This analysis asks the parties
to answer the following economic questions:
1. Has the value of the relevant parcel been significantly dimin-
ished?
2. Can investment in the relevant parcel be recouped? Re-
couped at opportunity cost?
3. Does the return on investment in the relevant parcel before
and after the permit denial reasonably exceed the opportunity cost
of money, i.e., is the return to the entire investment economically
viable before and after permit denial? Or, does the permit denial
frustrate investment-backed expectations? 214
The answers to these questions will determine when a partial regulatory
taking has occurred and just compensation is due.215 The analysis set forth in
Florida Rock V attempts to get past the broken balancing test of Penn Cen-
tral and sets forth a stable framework for when "a severe, but not total, loss
of the economically viable use of plaintiff's property" demands just compen-
216
sation.
However, assuming the Court maintains its position that mere diminu-
tion in value is not enough to constitute a taking, courts across the nation
must interpret another muddled economic prong of the Penn Central test
labeled as interference with the claimant's "distinct investment-backed ex-
pectations., 217 The United States Supreme Court has left the meaning of
"investment-backed expectations" undefined.2 8 One of the problems is clas-
sifying property by using the phrase "investment-backed" because "[a]ll ex-
pectations in privately held property are investment-backed by purchase or
acquisition., 219 Another problem is that both parties to the suit, the property
212. Id. at 1570.
213. Fla. Rock V, 45 Fed. Cl. at 23; William W. Wade, Economic Backbone of the Penn
Central Test After Florida Rock V, K&K, and Palazzolo, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 11221, 11226
(2002).
214. Wade, supra note 213, at 11226.
215. See generally Fla. Rock V, 45 Fed. Cl. 21.
216. Id. at 23.
217. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
218. See Mandelker, supra note 186, at 225.
219. Id. at 226.
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owner(s) and the government, "can legitimately claim expectations entitled
to protection."22
One way to avoid the problems with "investment-backed expectations"
is known as the "entitlement-to-property theory," which recognizes that pro-
tecting landowners' rights is paramount to other considerations in takings
law.22' By accepting a unitary theory such as the entitlement theory, only
one side of the battle can claim expectations.222
A more thorough approach to the problem relates back to the founder of
the phrase "investment-backed expectations., 223 The United States Supreme
Court did not formulate "investment-backed expectations" on its own, but
instead borrowed the phrase from the influential work of Frank I. Michel-
man.224 In his article, Michelman wrote that a proper test asks, "whether or
not the measure in question can easily be seen to have practically deprived
the claimant of some distinctly perceived, sharply crystallized, investment-
backed expectation. "225 Unfortunately, the Court did not adopt the analysis
of Michelman, which would have avoided the years of ensuing confusion.226
Michelman suggests weighing "[d]emoralization costs" against
"[s]ettlement costs. ' ' 2 Michelman defines demoralization costs by looking
to the amount of compensation which would be necessary to satisfy those
who have suffered through regulation, combined with the amount of lost
value caused by the regulation. 22' An example of lost value is a decrease in
investment and development due to fears that such a regulation may result in
similar effects on those similarly situated.229
These demoralization costs must then be weighed against the settlement
costs, which are defined as "the dollar value of the time, effort, and resources
which would be required in order to reach compensation settlements ade-
quate to avoid demoralization CoStS., 230 If the demoralization costs are
greater than the settlement costs, then compensation is due. 23' This analysis
220. Id. at 227.
221. Id. at 227-28.
222. See id.
223. Michelman, supra note 31, at 1213.
224. See id.
225. Id. at 1233.
226. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (failing to
mention the demoralization and settlement costs highlighted by Michelman).
227. Michelman, supra note 31, at 1214-15.
228. Id. at 1214.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 1215.
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conforms with the rules discussed throughout this article.232 For example, in
the case of a Loretto-type physical occupation, "settlement costs are likely to
be low and demoralization costs (absent compensation) to be high."233
Therefore, compensation would be due.2" In a Penn Central analysis, the
"ad hoc, factual inquir[y], 235 could remain intact, and Michelman's analysis
would set forth a balancing test with defined terms. 236 The fact that no tak-
ings claimant has ever prevailed under the Penn Central test suggests that it
is time for a change.237
One of the problems with suggesting a replacement balancing test is
that some of the same problems will arise.238 While the Michelman test does
define the terms used in its analysis, any balancing test will allow "bias,
prejudice, and incompetence" to be brought into the analysis.2 39 Even though
judges are supposed to be insulated from political pressures, they may have
their own political or ideological desires to push upon the public. 240 For
these reasons, another suggestion may be discarding the Penn Central test in
exchange for bright line rules which provide greater protection to property
owners.24 Examples of these rules are set forth in legislative proposals.242
Such proposals call for compensation when diminution in value is as low as
twenty percent.243 Legislative proposals show that many lawmakers believe
that when an individual has lost a portion of their property rights, just com-
pensation should be paid.2 4 While bright line rules must have exceptions,
such rules may be the only answer to protecting property rights.245
While the economic factors of the Penn Central test are usually the de-
ciding factor, courts must also consider the "character of the governmental
action. ' 246 The character prong of the Penn Central test focuses on whether
232. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 43, at 1234.
233. Id.
234. See Michelman, supra note 31, at 1215.
235. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
236. See generally id. at 1165.
237. See Echeverria II, supra note 202.
238. See Mattingly, supra note 167, at 716.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. See generally Dillon, supra note 31, at 243-50.
242. See id. at 246-50.
243. See id. at 246.
244. See id.
245. See Echeverria II, supra note 202 at 4 (indicating that no regulatory takings claimant
has ever prevailed under the Penn Central analysis).
246. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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a government action promotes the common good.24 One problem with the
character prong of the Penn Central test is the deference that courts show
economic and social regulations.248 Such deference means that all regula-
tions that meet "a very low threshold" of public benefit are given substantial
weight in the analysis.249
In order to balance this deference towards government regulation, the
courts should scrutinize the actions of the regulators in the same manner they
scrutinize takings claims.2 50 To reach the fairness the Penn Central test
strives for, "the motivation and circumstances of the regulator" should be
analyzed as well."' Applying the same standard to government regulators as
to private property owners helps make the character prong symmetrical and
moves toward a fair balance.252 The character prong of the Penn Central test
must mesh with the idea that a government should not force "some people
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole. 253
Whatever approach property advocates pursue, they must get back to
the notion "that the state's rights against its citizens are no greater than the
sum of the rights of the individuals whom it benefits in any given transac-
tion."254 The answer to the question of how much power the government
should have to take property is the government should only have the power
to force exchanges of property when it can leave the property owners with
rights more valuable than those which are lost.
255
VI. CONCLUSION
The efforts of the United States Supreme Court have failed to attain a
true balancing test which meets even the most liberal standard of justice and
fairness. This failure is highlighted by the fact that since the Penn Central
test was set forth in 1978, the Court has rarely found that a regulatory taking
247. See Steven J. Eagle, "Character" as "Worthiness:" A New Meaning for Penn Cen-
tral's Third Test?, ZONING & PLAN. L. REP., June 2004, at 2, available at http://mason.gmu.
edu/-seagle/pubs/2004_Character_asWorthinessZPLR.pdf.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. See id.
251. Id. at 6.
252. Eagle, supra note 247, at 7.
253. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
254. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 331 (1985).
255. Id. at 332.
[Vol. 30:3:445
26
Nova Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [2006], Art. 7
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol30/iss3/7
SUBSTANTIALLY ADVANCING PENN CENTRAL
had occurred.256 In fact, the few cases that have been decided in favor of a
takings claimant have been decided as a categorical or per se taking as de-
fined in Lucas and Loretto.257 This leads to the conclusion that a takings
claimant has never prevailed under the Penn Central test. Such a conclusion
is not reached through a true balancing test.
As takings opinions continue to come down from the United States Su-
preme Court, the balance remains tilted in favor of government regulation.258
This article has shown how the constitutional interpretation has moved from
a notion of property as security towards the notion of property as social effi-
ciency. While the recent cases from the United States Supreme Court may
have broken many of the arrows in the property advocate's quiver, and the
Penn Central test as it stands heavily armors the government, the changes
suggested in this article may sharpen this remaining arrow and provide a
chink in the government's mail.
Getting back to the roots of regulatory takings, in which private prop-
erty was viewed with the notion that it was secure, is essential to the mainte-
nance of our society. In foreshadowing the pressures which rest on the tak-
ings issue today, Justice Holmes warned that courts were "in danger of for-
getting that a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not
enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitu-
tional way of paying for the change."' 59 This article takes the position that
the courts have crossed that line, have gone too far, and need to consider
revising the interpretation of the Penn Central test in order to provide private
property and business owners the protections to which they are constitution-
ally entitled.
256. See Mattingly, supra note 167, at 699.
257. See id.; Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992); Loretto v. Tele-
prompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).
258. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc, 125 S. Ct. 2074 (2005); San Remo Hotel v. City
of San Francisco, 125 S. Ct. 2491 (2005); Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655
(2005).
259. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
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